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The Politicization of ex post Policy Evaluation in the EU 
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Abstract 
The European Commission’s 2015 Better Regulation package has placed ex post evaluation 
at the centre of European governance. This strengthens a trend of gradual politicization of 
evaluation in European policymaking. This article analyses how the European Commission’s 
approach to ex post policy evaluation has changed over the last decade. It shows how 
evaluation has developed from a rather technical process to a more politicized process, which 
is clearly linked to political priority setting, subject to centralized control, and involving a 
wider set of actors. At the same time, it argues that the Commission avoids a profound debate 
on the merits and objectives of the process of evaluation itself and concludes on the merits 
and risks of evaluation at times of rising populism.  
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A Introduction 
 
Policy evaluation is not new in European Union (EU) policymaking. The EU has long had a 
legal requirement for ex post evaluation in relation to expenditure policies, and some 
regulatory instruments include clauses for ex post review, monitoring or evaluation. Yet the 
practice of evaluation has often been ad hoc and diverse across policy areas and Commission 
Directorates-General (DGs), whilst efforts for a more coherent approach have primarily 
focused on financial accountability. Ex post evaluation has mainly been of a technical nature, 
attracting little political attention. However, over the last 15 years, the European Commission 
has gradually built up its efforts in relation to ex post evaluation; and with the presentation of 
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the Commission’s Better Regulation package
1
 in May 2015, ex post evaluation has become a 
key issue on the political agenda. This article analyses this development as a gradual 
politicization of ex post evaluation in European governance. 
It is important to first clarify the concepts of (policy) evaluation and politicization 
used in this article. The European Commission describes evaluation in its 2015 Better 
Regulation Guidelines as “a tool to help the Commission assess the actual performance of EU 
interventions compared to initial activities”,
2
 and defines it as  
an evidence-based judgment of the extent to which an intervention has: 
− been effective
 
[ie do the verified effects correspond to the original objectives?) 
and efficient [ie where the costs justified?] 
− been relevant given the needs and its objectives [ie do the original objectives still 
correspond to the needs of the EU?] 
− been coherent both internally and with other EU policy interventions and 
− achieved EU added value [ie compared to what could be achieved by the Member 
States]. 
 
In the Commission’s use of the concept, ‘evaluation’ normally refers to ex post (i.e., 
retrospective) evaluation, which can be interim (i.e., at the midterm of an initiative), final (at 
its conclusion) or ex post in the strict sense (which can take place several years after the 
intervention has finished). The Commission talks about ex ante evaluation only in relation to 
expenditure programmes. The ex ante appraisal of new EU (regulatory) initiatives that take 
place via Integrated Impact Assessments is usually not referred to as ‘evaluation’. Although 
linguistically there are no particular reasons to reserve the concept of evaluation to ex post 
and not ex ante appraisal, I will follow the Commission’s predominant use of terminology 
here by using ‘evaluation’ or ‘policy evaluation’ as a shorthand for ex post evaluation, unless 
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explicitly indicated otherwise, such as in the case of ‘evaluation throughout the policy cycle’, 
which implies both ex ante and ex post evaluation.  
It is equally useful at this stage to clarify what I understand to be politicization. The 
narrower, and institutionally focused, use of the concept of politicization is found in the 
political science and public administration literature that deals with the relationship between 
the assumed ‘neutral’ character of the bureaucracy and the political imperatives of elected 
politicians.
3
 The more the bureaucracy is steered by political imperatives, the more the 
administration is politicized. Political control over the administration is desirable, as 
administrators lack the political elected mandate of politicians. At the same time, strong 
politicization of the administration may undermine the expertise of the administration and 
make policy excessively dependent on short-term political interests. Such politicization is 
particularly problematic when one is dealing with institutions that should profit from a 
considerable independence, such as courts or independent central banks.  
A broader use of the concept of politicization relates less to institutions and more to 
the political salience of societal issues. When an issue is politicized, it becomes part of 
political debate and discussion. More precisely, it will be discussed within the political realm, 
which includes political (elected) representatives, party politics, interest groups and, most 
broadly, public debate. Politicization is then measured in terms of both salience (when does 
an issue rise higher on the political agenda?) and contestation (how polarized are positions 
about it?).
4
 However, as a debate becomes more polarized, interest-based arguments are more 
likely to take the lead over evidence-based argumentation or search for the truth. The concept 
of politicization therefore often has a negative connotation. Most narrowly, a politicized 
debate would be characterized by motives of party politics, or simply politicians’ interest in 
re-election, at the cost of expertise judgement. Hence, when one talks about the politicization 
of migration policy, or of crime, it most often comes with warning bells that the debate is not 
properly informed.
5
 The tension between sound evidence and political motives and 
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argumentation has particularly been discussed in science and technology studies, where 
analysis of the scientification of politics has gone hand in hand with findings about the 
politicization of science.
6
  
However, it should be said that politicization is not inherently bad. At its most basic 
level, it means that a topic is brought in the public realm of politics, which should ensure 
decision-making considering the common good. This positive role of politicization comes 
best to the forefront when politicization is pitched against its opposite, namely 
‘technocratization’. The latter also often has a negative connotation when it is used to refer to 
situations in which decision-making that should be made in the public realm is unduly kept in 
the hands of experts and administrators.
7
 At the same time, the shielding of expert advice, or 
even decision-making, from political influences has often been heralded in modern 
governance, as it would ensure that policymaking is based on the best available evidence, 
independent of sectoral interests and short-term thinking that drives politicians.
8
 Neither 
politicization nor technocratization is thus inherently bad. The question is about the right 
balance between the two. I therefore use politicization in this article as a ‘neutral’ concept, not 
implying a normative judgement, but simply referring to a process in which the topic of 
evaluation becomes increasingly part of a debate and agenda that is set, influenced by and 
played out in the political realm and not simply by experts and administrators. At the same 
time, I assess advantages and pitfalls of such politicization. 
In Section B, I first briefly describe how policy evaluation in the EU developed from a 
focus on financial accountability that was mainly technical in nature, to a key principle of 
Better Regulation, identifying the key features of evaluation in the Commission’s approach in 
recent years, and as part of the Better Regulation package in particular. The following 
sections will analyse the increasing politicization of evaluation that results from this 
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development. Section C analyses how evaluation becomes more politicized as it becomes a 
key element of the Better Regulation strategy, which the Juncker Commission has propelled 
to a key political priority. Section D analyses the politicization that is inherent when 
evaluation becomes a general principle of Better Regulation, applied to both redistributive 
and regulatory policies and throughout the policy cycle. Section E studies the politicization 
that results from the increased participatory nature of EU policy evaluation. I finally conclude 
with some reflections on the challenges of a more politicized evaluation strategy, particularly 
at a time when populism delegitimizes many modern governance mechanisms. 
 
B From Financial Accountability to a General Principle of Better Regulation 
 
The EU has engaged in project and programme evaluation for several decades now. However, 
evaluation has been especially focused on expenditure policies, such as structural funds, 
research and development, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and development aid. 
Although initial evaluation practices developed ad hoc within different DGs, the increase in 
the EU budget and EU expenditure during the 1990s, as well as instances of corruption and 
the legitimacy crisis related to the resignation of the Santer Commission, led to a more 
systematic approach to evaluation in the European Commission. Legal requirements and 
control were tightened to ensure financial accountability.  
Evaluation became centrally enshrined in budgetary allocations and the 7-year 
financial programming cycle. Evaluation standards were developed by DG Budget in 1999 
(and revised in 2004) to guide DGs in their evaluation work, particularly when outsourcing 
evaluation to external consultants.
9
 All DGs were supposed to develop their evaluation 
capacity, particularly through the establishment of evaluation units. However, many DGs 
(especially those not involved in expenditure policy) considered evaluation a formality they 
had to comply with, rather than a useful exercise they could learn from.
10
 
More recently, the European Commission has aimed for a reorientation of its 
evaluation policy. The reorientation of evaluation policy was first set out in the 2007 
Commission Communication “Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of 
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evaluation”
11
 and was subsequently given more clout by the embedding of evaluation into the 
broader Better Regulation agenda. The turn from ‘Better Regulation’ to ‘Smart Regulation’ in 
2010
12
 was precisely characterized by the argument that ‘Better/Smart Regulation’ should be 
taken into account throughout the entire policy cycle and not just at the start of it (where most 
Better Regulation tools had until then been focused). This means in particular that ex post 
evaluation should gain a more central place in the policymaking process and should be linked 
to the ex ante assessment of new policy intervention. The Commission’s 2013 
Communication “Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving 
evaluation”
13
 reiterates this approach in catchy terms by talking about the ‘evaluate first’ 
principle and promoting an ‘evaluation culture’ in the Commission, whilst more concrete 
proposals were to be proposed in new evaluation guidelines. The Better Regulation 
Guidelines adopted in May 2015 finally consolidate this new approach, by bringing together 
guidelines on (ex ante) integrated impact assessments and (ex post) evaluation and putting the 
issue of Better Regulation on the highest political agenda. 
The key features of the new approach to evaluation resulting from the four 
Communications (2007 ‘Reinforcing Evaluation’, 2010 ‘Smart Regulation’, 2013 ‘Improving 
evaluation’ and 2015 ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’) are the following: 
1) Evaluation has to be applied to all types of EU intervention: expenditure policy as well 
as regulatory intervention, including soft law measures. Although the idea to apply 
evaluation beyond expenditure policies goes back more than a decade, it is only in the 
2007 and 2010 Communications that concrete measures were proposed for a more 
systematic application of evaluation to regulatory intervention. Between 2002 and 
2012 only about one third of legislative measures were evaluated, and whilst the data 
show some increase, this has not been consistent.
14
 The 2015 Better Regulation 
Guidelines now make evaluation a general principle of Better Regulation. 
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2) The ‘evaluate first’ principle locates evaluation firmly within the policy cycle. New 
EU intervention can only occur after an assessment of past action has been made. 
Although evaluation of expenditure policy has long been linked to the 7-year financial 
programme cycle, the 2007 Communication sets the Commission on track to fit 
evaluation of all its actions into its strategic planning and programming cycle. Most 
importantly, ex post evaluation should feed back into the EU system of ex ante impact 
assessments, which has been solidly established since 2003.  
3) The Commission’s emphasis upon the place of evaluation in the policy cycle goes 
hand in hand with the embedding of evaluation within the Better Regulation agenda, 
and the ‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme’ (REFIT)  in particular. As 
part of the Better Regulation agenda, the Commission initiated REFIT in December 
2012 in order to review the entire stock of EU legislation
15
; to identify burdens, 
inconsistencies, gaps or ineffective measures, with the aim to ensure “a simple, clear, 
stable and predictable regulatory framework for businesses, workers and citizens”.
16
  
Evaluation has always had a ‘value for money’ character. Control over the 
implementation of expenditure policies would ensure a certain level of accountability 
regarding whether citizens had got what they paid for. However, in the Better 
Regulation context, the value for money argument develops from ex post 
accountability to making use of ex post evaluation to decide on the desirability of 
future action, particularly in the context of a regulatory framework that aims to be as 
‘smart’ and ‘thin’ as possible. The Commission considers evaluation a ‘key tool’ in its 
Better Regulation agenda, not only to ensure better (quality) regulation but also, and 
particularly, to avoid regulatory burden: “Evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency 
of EU legislation will improve the quality of policy-making and help to identify new 
opportunities to simplify legislation and reduce administrative burdens.”
17
 Or as the 
2013 Evaluation Communication states it: “There can be a tendency to look forward 
and focus on new initiatives. But changes are costly and take time to implement – so 
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they need to be justified and greater attention needs to be paid to looking back before 
moving forward.”
18
  
4) Finally, by placing evaluation centrally in the policy cycle for all EU action, ex post 
evaluation should ensure, above all, policy learning, and not just (financial) 
programme or project learning. Evaluation should not only be the remit of a small 
number of administrators directly involved in a specific programme or project but 
should feed back into the political decision-making process. This underpins the 
Commission’s attention to ensuring better communication and transparency so as to 
increase the number of actors that can be involved in this learning process, being 
either stakeholders or other institutional actors.  
 
Having established these key features of the Commission’s new evaluation approach, the 
following sections more closely analyse how this affects the politicization of evaluation.  
 
C Policy Evaluation as a Political Priority, Steered from the Top 
I Political Priority 
 
A key aspect of the politicization of evaluation results from it getting centre stage of the 
political agenda. More precisely, it becomes a tool of centralization within the Commission, 
allowing the College of Commissioners, and especially the Commission President and the 
First Vice President for Better Regulation, to keep bottom-up initiatives from Commission 
DGs in line with the politically set agenda, and the goal of ‘Better Regulation’ and ‘reducing 
regulatory burden’. 
Over the last decade, evaluation policy in the Commission has gradually been placed 
under more centralized control. Initially the key centralizing role was played by DG Budget, 
which had the most experience with ex post evaluation, and adopted guidelines to steer the 
various DG practices. However, DG Budget’s steering of evaluation was soft guidance that 
often did not provide for major change in evaluation practice beyond areas of expenditure 
policy. The last evaluation guidelines drafted by DG Budget (Guidelines 2004) were 
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presented as a “Practical Guide for the Commission Services” “presenting practical solutions 
and good practices”.
19
 
As ex post evaluation was extended to regulatory action and became a key political 
priority, the Secretariat General became the centralized guiding unit to coordinate and steer 
evaluation in 2009. This facilitates linking ex post and ex ante evaluation, as the Secretariat 
General is also responsible for monitoring integrated impact assessments. At the same time, it 
brings evaluation closer to the political decision-making in the Commission. The Secretariat 
General has hierarchical control over the DGs and sits directly under the Commission’s 
Presidency. Evaluation becomes a key tool of steering DG initiatives more stringently in 
function of the policy priorities set out by the College of Commissioners, and the Commission 
President in particular. 
As the new evaluation guidelines are now included in the Better Regulation 
Guidelines drafted by the Secretariat General, they become more stringent in nature, 
compared to the ‘practical solutions and good practices’ previously suggested by DG Budget. 
As the document states, “the main guidelines set out the mandatory requirements and 
obligations for each step in the policy cycle whilst the Toolbox provides additional guidance 
and advice which is not binding unless expressly stated to be so” (emphasis added).
20
 
The centralization of evaluation within the Commission should be seen in the context 
of two other processes. Firstly, the Commission’s management in general has become more 
centralized over the last decade in an attempt to make the Commission both more presidential 
and political in nature. The Commission President is no longer a primus inter pares among the 
other Commissioners, but increasingly a primus super pares, with increasing powers over the 
appointment, organization and dismissal of other commissioners, and the ability to set 
agendas and define the alternatives at stake.
21
 The Secretariat General has been strengthened 
to support him in that role,
22
 so that the President has increased control not only over the 
College of Commissioners but equally over the Commission bureaucracy. At the same time, 
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the Commission has become more political in nature through the gradually strengthened 
relationship between the European Parliament (EP) elections and the appointment and 
accountability of the Commission.
23
 The 2014 EP elections strengthened this process further 
by the introduction of a system of ‘Spitzenkandidaten’, in which each political party in the EP 
put forward its own candidate, who would become Commission President if that party turned 
out to be the biggest in the Parliament. Although the system of Spitzenkandidaten was not 
legally set out in the Treaties and the Member States (who retain the power to appoint the 
Commissioners) could have refused this system, they respected the EP invention of 
Spitzenkandidaten and appointed the candidate of the political party that won the elections as 
Commission President, namely Jean-Claude Juncker from the European People’s Party.
24
 As I 
will further explain below, Juncker has repeatedly referred to this ‘political mandate’ to 
defend a more political Commission. 
The second key development explaining the centralization of evaluation in the work of 
the Commission is the increasing political priority for reducing the regulatory burden. The 
establishment of the REFIT programme in 2012 was key in this direction, but with the coming 
into office of the Juncker Commission, this issue becomes even more central to the 
Commission’s agenda and organization of its work. Juncker, and First Vice President 
Timmermans (responsible for Better Regulation), interpret the rising Euroscepticism 
expressed in the EP elections of 2014 as a strong sign that people consider the European 
regulatory framework too burdensome. The result of the EP elections is thus seen as a 
mandate for the new Commission to make regulatory burden their primary target.  
In its first Work Programme, the Juncker Commission states, 
 
“…the bulk of what happens in the EU today and how our citizens judge the EU is 
based on existing legislation and programmes. Their immediate concerns are with the 
stock of existing rules, which is why this Commission is making a political priority of 
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lightening the regulatory load while keeping high levels of social, health and 
environmental protection and consumer choice. We will overhaul the rules to make 
sure they contribute to the jobs and growth agenda and do not impose unnecessary red 
tape or administrative burdens, while at the same time bringing the benefits that 
citizens expect. Where the rules are outdated or out of line with our priorities, we will 
review and improve them. Where there is unnecessary red tape, we will cut it. Where 
the rules we have make sense and serve our objectives, we will work actively to 
ensure they are properly applied, implemented and enforced so they deliver real 
benefits to citizens. And we will use the other tools we have available to drive jobs 
and growth, in particular the EU budget which is primarily a means for smart 
investment in Member States and regions”. (emphasis added)
25
 
 
The result is a Commission that wants to be big on big things, and small on small things. It 
would be difficult to counter-argue the Commission’s statement that “Citizens expect the EU 
to make a difference on the big economic and social challenges – high unemployment, slow 
growth, high levels of public debt, an investment gap and lack of competitiveness in the 
global marketplace”.
26
 Rising Euroscepticism is surely linked to the failure of the EU to 
address big social challenges.
27
 The Juncker Commission’s starting point is a promise to focus 
on these big challenges. At the same time, its focus on the regulatory burden and 
interpretation of the EP elections as being citizens wanting less EU interference is more open 
to questioning. Can the EP elections of 2014 really be interpreted as a primary question to 
reduce red tape for business, rather than dissatisfaction with the way the EU had dealt with 
the financial crisis and failure to address socio-economic problems appropriately? 
That the Commission sees itself increasingly as a political Commission mandated by 
the EP elections and that the 2014 elections implied answering the concern of regulatory 
burden is nicely illustrated by the following quote from the European Commission’s State of 
the Union in September 2016: 
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“The Commission has to take responsibility by being political, and not technocratic. A 
political Commission is one that listens to the European Parliament, listens to all 
Member States, and listens to the people. 
And it is us listening that motivated my Commission to withdraw 100 proposals in our 
first 2 years of office, to present 80% fewer initiatives than over the past 5 years and to 
launch a thorough review of all existing legislation. Because only by focusing on 
where Europe can provide real added value and deliver results, we will be able to 
make Europe a better, more trusted place.”
28
 
 
Put differently, when Juncker proudly sets out what his ‘political Commission’ has achieved 
after 2 years in charge, his first reference is to the key objective of reducing the regulatory 
burden. 
Better Regulation, and evaluation in particular, is a key tool to attaining this political 
priority. The same political argument can thus be found when the Commission sets out the 
importance of evaluation and fitness checks in the 2015 Better Regulation Communication: 
“The natural tendency of politicians is to focus on new initiatives. However, the EU is judged 
not just on new political initiatives, but on the benefits and the burden of existing EU 
legislation. As such, actively managing existing EU legislation is just as important politically 
as preparing new initiatives.”
29
 Evaluation is no longer simply an issue of technocratic 
learning but a key tool to realize a political priority of a European Commission that is more 
centralized and motivated to answer what it sees as the lessons to be drawn from the 2014 EP 
elections. 
 
II Control, Planning and Scrutiny 
 
Three institutional developments exemplify the politicization of evaluation by centralizing 
political control over it. 
Firstly, Juncker immediately translated ‘his political mandate’ from the EP elections 
into a new way of organizing the Commission, which would allow more centralized control. 
The Commissioners are organized in project teams, which are each led by a Vice President, 
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thus creating some level of hierarchy among Commissioners. Moreover, a First Vice 
President has been created with the specific portfolio of Better Regulation, thus allowing it to 
sit at the nexus of the organizational hierarchy of the Commission. As evaluation has become 
a key element of the Better Regulation strategy, this organization of the College of 
Commissioners allows steering of evaluation practices across all DGs and optimizing its 
added value in function of political priorities. 
Secondly, centralized control is strengthened by better planning of evaluation. A 
decision to evaluate can result from several elements. Expenditure programmes have legal 
requirements for cyclical evaluation, whilst regulatory measures may include legal clauses to 
review or evaluate after a certain period. Moreover, all DGs are now required to set up an 
evaluation contact point (email address) to answer questions by stakeholders, which may 
provide input for considering evaluation.
30
 Most importantly, the REFIT programme provides 
a regulatory screening of the acquis comunitaire, and sets out political priorities for evaluation 
and fitness checks. DGs are expected to develop annual and multi-annual evaluation 
programmes. The decision for major evaluations and fitness checks, particularly if part of 
REFIT, is to be politically validated by the Commissioner, whilst non-major evaluations and 
fitness checks can be endorsed by the Director General’s approval of the DGs Management 
Plan.
31
 
Thirdly, to ensure centralized control and common evaluation practices across DGs, 
the Better Regulation package has, for the first time, established scrutiny of evaluation 
practices, via the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). The RSB (previously named Impact 
Assessment Board) until then only had responsibility in relation to (ex ante) impact 
assessments, but its role is now extended to all fitness checks and all major evaluations.
32
 The 
qualification ‘major’ leaves much room for interpretation, so scrutiny of evaluations by the 
RSB is far from being as systematic as it is for impact assessments (for which RSB scrutiny is 
always required, with some limited exceptions). In 2016, for instance, the RSB discussed 
seven evaluations
33
 (including two fitness checks, two programme evaluations and three 
regulatory evaluations) against 56 impact assessments. Unlike for impact assessments, the 
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RSB has so far not attached positive or negative judgements to individual evaluations, 
although it intends to do so from 2017 onwards.
34
 However, even then, there will not be a 
procedural ‘sanctioning mechanism’ when an evaluation is judged negatively, unlike for 
impact assessments, which are sent back to the DG for redrafting if judged negatively by the 
RSB. Therefore, RSB opinions on evaluations are supposed to create learning in the longer 
term and do not ensure sanctioned quality control on individual evaluations. Of the seven 
assessments of evaluations in 2016, for instance, the RSB concluded that there were generally 
shortcomings regarding critical analysis of coherence, relevance and added value, and there 
were no systematic conclusions for follow-up action, whilst the analysis of effectiveness and 
efficiency was more complete in evaluation reports.
35
 The scrutiny of evaluation is thus not as 
tight as that of impact assessments, but there is clearly an intention to streamline evaluation 
practices across DGs in function of priorities and procedures set out centrally. 
 
D Evaluation as a General Principle throughout the Policy Cycle 
I Linking ex ante and ex post 
 
When evaluation becomes a general principle throughout the policy cycle for all types of 
policy intervention, it will inevitably be more political in nature than when it is simply an ex 
post tool of financial accountability limited to expenditure programmes.  
It is worth distinguishing between what are generally seen in the academic literature 
(and partially reflected in EU official discourse) as the two key objectives of evaluation, 
namely accountability and learning.
36
 Both accountability and learning can happen at a more 
technocratic or more political level.  
Evaluation focuses more on technocratic accountability when it is primarily financial 
or legalistic in nature. It is then an exercise in ensuring that the financial accounts are correct 
and the legal rules have been respected. Much of such cyclical financial and legal 
accountability does not require high political salience. It is a guarantee against misuse or 
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inefficient use of resources that largely function through deterrent and permanent technical 
control rather than high levels of politicization. The political accountability of this process 
only comes into play when the evaluation report would be used in the EP to highlight waste of 
taxpayers’ money and bad implementation or to more politically contest the added value of 
the intervention.
37
 
Similarly, learning in evaluation can remain technocratic. When evaluation is focused 
on projects and programmes, learning is often limited to the officers dealing with it. 
Experience from evaluation may feed into the next cycle of a programme, but even then this 
is not straightforward as policy officers dealing with evaluation of the past project/programme 
may be different than those drafting the new one. 
By making evaluation a general principle throughout the policy cycle, accountability 
and learning become more political in nature throughout the entire process. The ‘evaluation 
first’ principle links ex post evaluation inevitably to judgement calls that are more political in 
nature. Past initiatives are assessed in function of the ability to make judgements on the 
orientation and re-orientation of future action. Evaluation is not simply done to confirm that 
the rules have been respected or that the original objectives have been reached, but also to 
feed in more political judgement calls on what the future objectives should be. This is 
strengthened by the fact that the Commission’s new evaluation strategy aims explicitly at 
learning and accountability that goes beyond the individual project or programme. Of 
particular importance in this regard are ‘fitness checks’, which were introduced in 2010. 
Fitness checks aim at a comprehensive evaluation of a policy area (i.e. the evaluation of a 
group of related interventions that are linked by a common set of objectives) rather than of 
single programmes or acts. Fitness checks help to give higher political leverage to evaluation, 
as they extend beyond the tiny network of a single regulatory intervention. At the same time, 
they are particularly embedded in the political priority of the REFIT programme to reduce the 
regulatory burden. 
 
II Expenditure and Regulatory Policy 
 
One can argue that it is not only the intrinsic link between ex ante and ex post evaluation that 
strengthens the politicized nature of the process but also that evaluation is now generally 
extended to regulatory intervention and not just expenditure policy. Traditionally, it is often 
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argued that expenditure policy is more politicized in character than regulatory policy, as 
redistributive choices inevitably stir strong interest politics whilst regulation would often fall 
under the veil of technical detail
38
 or get away with the assumption that it is win-win in 
nature. However, the same does not necessarily hold true for evaluation. Although decisions 
on new expenditure programmes inevitable involve political choices, assessment of past 
programmes can be relatively neatly done based on well-established financial accountability 
rules. Put differently, future ex ante assessment and intervention do not necessarily intervene 
in the nature of previous ex post evaluation, for which there are well-established rules and 
criteria. The latter, though, is much less the case for regulatory intervention. The tools for ex 
post evaluation of regulatory intervention are far less established and less clear-cut.
39
 
Measuring the costs and benefits of existing regulatory policy is bound to open more 
questions about how this can be quantified than in the case of expenditure policy. Therefore, 
evaluation of regulatory action is bound to raise more political debate on the value and 
method of quantification and how methodology relates to the set objectives. Put differently, in 
the case of expenditure, there is more likely to be a clearer divide between an ex post 
evaluation based on a recognized established method, which might then fit (or not fit) into a 
separate debate on new redistributive intervention; whilst in the case of regulatory 
intervention, there is more likely a blurring of the debates on the correct target setting and 
their measurement in both ex post and ex ante evaluation. 
 
III The Interinstitutional Dimension 
 
In addition to the intrinsic link between ex ante and ex post evaluation, and the application of 
evaluation to both expenditure and regulatory policy, there is a third way in which evaluation 
becomes more politicized when applied as a general principle throughout the policy cycle. 
With the 2015 Better Regulation package, the Commission increasingly stresses that Better 
Regulation is not only the Commission’s responsibility. “The European Parliament and the 
Council should, therefore, mirror the Commission’s commitment to better regulation, as 
																																																								
38
 The classical argument of the EU as a regulatory state is based on this premise. See Majone, 1996. 
39
 H. Summa & J. Toulemonde, ‘Evaluation in the European Union: Addressing Complexity and Ambiguity’, in 
J. Furubo, R.C. Rist & R. Sandahl (Eds.), International Atlas of Evaluation, London, Transaction Publishers, pp. 
407–424; T. Fitzpatrick, ‘Evaluating Legislation: An Alternative Approach for Evaluating EU Internal Market 
and Services Law’, Evaluation, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2012, pp. 477-499; Mastenbrouk et al., 2015, p. 4. 
	17 
should Member States when transposing and implementing EU law.”
40
 Better Regulation is 
an interinstitutional commitment and also extends to the Member States. In the 
Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on Better Lawmaking of 2016, the three institutions 
commit to coordinating their evaluation activities (though without providing any specific 
procedures),
41
 to include evaluation requirements in new regulation and to systematically 
consider the use of review clauses and sunset clauses.
42
 This suggests a collaborative effort on 
Better Regulation that appears to be of a rather technical nature. However, the increasing 
focus on the interinstitutional dimension of Better Regulation also creates a context in which 
the institutions are expected to scrutinize each other’s evidence base more actively, which 
also allows blame-shifting and contestation. Providing evidence, ex ante and ex post, is a duty 
for all, making the evidence-gathering process potentially more politicized, as it can become 
more openly the object of (interinstitutional) contestation. 
 
IV Evaluation as a ‘Neutral’ General Principle of Better Regulation or Subordinated to 
Pre-Established Political Agenda? 
 
The Commission presents evaluation (and evidence-based policymaking more broadly) as a 
general principle of Better Regulation. This appears to give it the aura of a neutral procedural 
principle. However, there is a strong tension here in the Commission’s approach. On the one 
hand, it aims to ‘depoliticize’ evaluation and present it as a neutral exercise of assessment that 
provides the evidence basis for political deliberation that would only follow subsequently. On 
the other hand, it has strongly linked evaluation to the political priority of reducing the 
regulatory burden. Whilst the Commission is proud to flag this as a political priority (and thus 
politicizes evaluation), it wants to avoid discussion on the value of such a political choice 
(thus avoiding politicization). The objectives of the evaluation system appear beyond 
discussion, whilst individual evaluations are said to be neutral as they should simply assess 
against the originally set objectives of a regulatory act, programme or project without 
debating such objectives. However, evaluation always implies choices about priorities, what 
to evaluate and how to do it. As I will analyse in the following section, whilst the 
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Commission is keen to encourage participation to receive information on inefficiencies of 
existing policy, it is much less keen for the priorities and implicit choices of evaluation to be 
debated more broadly. 
 
E Politicization through Participation 
I Consultation 
 
In the words of the European Commission, “Better Regulation is not a bureaucratic exercise. 
Citizens, businesses and other stakeholders judge the EU on the impacts of its actions: not just 
new initiatives, but, even more importantly, the rules already in force” (emphasis added).
43
 
Therefore, “the Commission intends to listen more closely to citizens and stakeholders, and 
be open to their feedback, at every stage of the process – from the first idea, to when the 
Commission makes a proposal, through the adoption of legislation and its evaluation” 
(emphasis added).
44
 That the Commission heralds broad consultation is not new, particularly 
since the 2002 White Paper on European Governance.
45
 However, with the 2015 Better 
Regulation package, the Commission clearly goes a step further by supporting and 
institutionalizing participation and transparency throughout the entire policy cycle, including 
ex post evaluation.  
The 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines have considerably strengthened the 
participatory dimension of evaluation by requiring that the same principles and tools of 
consultation are applied to evaluation as to impact assessments. Participatory requirements 
have been a key feature of the Integrated Impact Assessment system ever since it was set up 
in 2003 and have always been clearly defined in the Impact Assessment Guidelines. For ex 
post evaluation, participatory requirements have been at best ad hoc, as part of the 
requirements set out to external consultants to whom evaluation tasks have been contracted 
out. The horizontal Evaluation Guidelines did not establish participation as a general principle 
of evaluation practice. Neither did they provide specific tools for it. According to a study by 
Mastenbroek et al. covering the period from 2002 to 2012, about 39% of the 216 evaluation 
reports on regulatory acts did not show stakeholder involvement at all, whilst in 51% 
stakeholders provided some information to the empirical part of the evaluation. Only in 9% 
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did stakeholders have a more prominent role by providing feedback on various aspects of the 
study.
46
 
Participation has long been perceived as something that came mainly after the 
evaluation had been made. By “publishing evaluation findings, the Commission is publicly 
taking responsibility for its actions, acknowledging how an intervention is performing and 
inviting further feedback”.
47
 The invitation for further feedback suggests a participatory 
approach to evaluation, but only after evaluation reports have been adopted. 
 
“The purpose of evaluations, namely to promote accountability/transparency and 
organisational learning, can only be achieved if the information produced by such 
evaluations reaches those to whom we are accountable to [sic] (general public, 
parliaments, etc.) or certain intermediaries (journalists) and those who should learn 
from the results. All evaluation reports of high quality should therefore be 
disseminated in a manner suited to the different audiences. Active discussion and 
debate on these findings should be encouraged.”
48
  
 
Hence, the main effort was on ensuring the publication of evaluation reports online, although 
the central database of evaluations provided on the Commission’s evaluation website has been 
far from comprehensive and reports are often scattered around on pages of individual DGs. 
Evaluation would thus be politicized, but only by ex post political debate by parliament and 
interest groups to ensure accountability. 
The 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines take a decisively different approach by 
considering participation also essential during the evaluation process and imposing 
procedures for that. “Stakeholder’s views [sic], practical experience and supporting evidence 
can help deliver higher quality and more credible evaluations.”
49
 
Evaluations now have to follow the General Principles and Minimum Standards of 
Consultation, that were first set out in 2002 for ex ante policy drafting, and are now included 
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in the 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines. Procedurally, participation in ex post evaluation is 
now also organized along the same procedural steps as participation in impact assessments. 
First of all, an interservice steering group (ISG) with representatives from DGs 
involved in the evaluation is established. The ISG has to draft an evaluation roadmap that 
summarizes the evaluation design, including clear statements on the subject, purpose and 
scope of evaluation, the issues to be addressed and the evidence to be gathered, including the 
consultation strategy. The Roadmap itself has to be made public and open to consultation for 
at least 4 weeks.
50
 Since June 2015 (1 month after the publication of the Better Regulation 
Guidelines) Evaluation Roadmaps are indeed published for consultation on the Commission’s 
Better Regulation webpage.
51
 
However, consultation on the Roadmap is the start, not the end of the participatory 
process. The Guidelines state that it is essential to consult on all the mandatory evaluation 
criteria, which are effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value.
52
 This 
assumes that the consultation process extends to the evaluation exercise itself and not simply 
to the Roadmap setting out its general features. As is the case in ex ante policy drafting, the 
responsible DG (and the ISG in particular) has some flexibility on how to organize its 
consultation strategy in the evaluation process.  
However, it has to comply with the following: 
1) The General Principles of Consultation: consult as widely as possible, make the 
consultation process and how it has affected policymaking transparent, consult at a 
time where stakeholder views can still make a difference and ensure consistency of 
consultation processes across services.
53
 
2) The five Minimum Standards of consultation: clear content of consultation; ensure 
that all relevant parties have an opportunity to express their opinions; ensure adequate 
publication of its consultation strategy, including compulsory announcement of open 
consultations on the ‘Your Voice in Europe’ single access point; provide sufficient 
time for responses; and acknowledgement of feedback (including publication of 
contributions and results).
54
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3) The consultation process needs to include a 12 week internet based public online 
consultation at some point over the lifetime of the evaluation (which, corresponding 
the minimum standards set out above, needs to be announced on the ‘Your Voice in 
Europe’ website), unless the Secretariat General allows a derogation.
55
 
 
Participation therefore becomes a general principle throughout the entire evaluation. This 
implies at least two open online consultations, namely one on the Roadmap (with a 
consultation period for a minimum of 4 weeks) and a second one further along during the 
evaluation (with an 8-week consultation period). This “should be complemented by other 
approaches and tools in order to engage all relevant stakeholders and to target potential 
information gaps”.
56
 Such complementary tools can be the consultation of existing expert 
groups or Member State committees, questionnaires, hearings or workshops. Each DG is also 
required to indicate a central evaluation contact point (e.g. an email address), which is 
responsible for answering questions from stakeholders on the planning, timing and progress 
of work on evaluations.
57
 
This new participatory approach to evaluation raises many challenges, some of a mere 
practical and others of a more substantive nature. I will start with the latter. 
Firstly, the new participatory approach politicizes evaluation in a very different way 
than was thus far the focus. Until now, interest politics and politicization were supposed to 
happen mainly once an evaluation report was produced. Evaluation was a rather independent 
exercise, to be done either by the Commission, or, in most cases, by an independent 
contractor. Such an ‘independent report’ would provide the evidence to ensure accountability, 
which could be ensured by parliamentary control and public debate. Hence, politicization 
happens ex post to evaluation and mainly to ensure accountability. By ensuring participation 
throughout the entire evaluation exercise, interest politics and politicization become a stronger 
feature of the entire process. 
Secondly, this raises practical questions, particularly as evaluation is traditionally 
outsourced to private consultancies. These consultancies lack the extensive experience the 
Commission has built up in relation to consultation practices for policy drafting and ex ante 
assessment. Can they quickly adjust to ‘copy’ these practices? Will the mandate for the 
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contractors include detailed provisions on which consultation strategy to follow and who to 
consult? 
Thirdly, whilst the Minimum Standards require that ‘all relevant parties have an 
opportunity to express their opinion’, it remains to be seen whether the two online 
consultations are supposed to automatically cover that requirement. 
Fourthly, extra efforts are planned to ensure feedback on consultation during 
evaluation. Results of the consultation should be reflected in the contractors’ report (if 
applicable) and the evaluation staff working document (SWD) that constitutes the 
Commission’s evaluation report. A synopsis report covering all consultations launched needs 
to be annexed to the SWD.
58
  
 
II Participation in REFIT: The REFIT Platform and ‘Lighten the Load’ 
 
In addition to the requirement for online consultations in evaluation, the most explicit 
institutionalization of participation in evaluation is via the creation of the REFIT Platform. 
The creation of a platform, including stakeholders, to advise on some aspects of the Better 
Regulation agenda is a clear element of politicization of issues that have long been 
approached as technical and bureaucratic in nature. However, it should immediately be 
stressed that the REFIT Platform has not been set up as a stakeholder platform to advise on all 
aspects of the BR agenda. Its focus is on the realization of the Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme. 
The role of the REFIT Platform is to invite, collect and assess suggestions from all 
available sources on how to reduce the regulatory and administrative burden and make 
subsequent recommendations to the Commission and Member States.
59
 The language of the 
Commission Decision setting up the REFIT Platform, as well as its composition, confirms the 
narrow focus of the Platform. In theory, a platform of stakeholders could have been given the 
opportunity to voice concerns and make suggestions about the direction of the Better 
Regulation agenda more broadly. Even if focused on regulatory fitness, one could imagine a 
platform that can highlight problems of implementation and suggest solutions not only 
because rules are ‘burdensome’ on business or administrations, but equally because they do 
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not reach their objectives. The latter could lead to suggestions for re-regulation or new 
regulation. Yet, whilst ‘effectiveness’ is an objective of the Better Regulation agenda, the 
REFIT Platform mandate does not mention it all. The focus is exclusively on reducing 
regulatory burden.  
Therefore, whilst aimed at stakeholder involvement, the REFIT Platform is actually 
expected to not politicize the debate. It has to work within the confines of the political priority 
already set out, namely reducing the regulatory burden, and is not expected to redefine what 
‘better’, ‘fitter’ or ‘more effective’ regulation means. It has little to say on the direction of the 
Better Regulation agenda, and even when highlighting problems with individual regulatory 
decisions, the task seems to focus on highlighting when they are burdensome rather than 
suggesting solutions on how the set policy objectives of regulation can be achieved more 
effectively. 
This focus is also reflected in the composition of the Platform. It is composed of a 
‘government group’, consisting of representatives of the Member States’ administration, and a 
‘stakeholder group’, consisting of up to 20 experts, “two of them representing the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, and the rest business, 
including from Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and from social partners and civil 
society organisations having direct expertise in the application of Union legislation”.
60
 
According to the Decision establishing the REFIT Platform, “the appointments [to the 
stakeholder group] shall ensure, to the extent possible, a balanced representation of the 
various sectors, interests and regions of the Union and gender”.
61
 
Among the stakeholders group of the REFIT Platform, one could argue that a balance 
has been sought between business and non-business interests. Nine members represent 
business associations: one from Business Europe, one Chamber of Commerce (Denmark), 
two SME associations (European and Dutch) and five associations representing particular 
industries (forest, food, household appliances, banking and technology). The ‘non-business’ 
stakeholder representatives could be divided into a group of six associations with a market-
correcting objective (Friends of the Earth Europe, European Trade Union Confederation, 
European Consumer Association BEUC, European Citizen Action Service, Finance Watch 
and the British Royal Society of Bird Protection) and a group of three ‘institutional actors’ (a 
representative from the European Economic and Social Committee, from the Committee of 
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the Regions and from the standardization bodies CEN+CENELEC). One member of the 
stakeholder group is appointed in a personal capacity (unlike all the others, who are said to 
represent the common interest of their stakeholder group),
62
 namely the Director of Europa 
decentraal, a Dutch non-profit knowledge centre that gives advice on the application of EU 
regulations to local and regional governments.
63
 
Although the stakeholders group shows a relative balance between business and non-
business interests, this does not guarantee a balance between opinions on whether Better 
Regulation should primarily be about reducing the regulatory burden or ensuring efficiency of 
regulation in terms of reaching its policy objectives. Four members of the stakeholder group 
(Friends of the Earth, ETUC, BEUC and Finance Watch), part of the Better Regulation 
Watchdog, have an openly critical approach to the risks of the concern for regulatory burden 
taking over the Better Regulation agenda and potentially undermining regulatory standards. 
With business representatives traditionally taking the opposite position, and other actors more 
‘neutral’ on the issue, the regulatory burden priority might well be the dominant one even 
within the stakeholder group. 
The prioritization of the regulatory burden as an objective of REFIT is also reflected 
in the composition of the government group. Just half of the government representatives come 
from horizontal administrative units, such as an office of the prime minister, specific BR 
units, EU legislation units or other public institutions that ensure quality of legislation such as 
the Conseil d’Etat. The other half all come from ministries of economy or trade. Other 
departments, such as environment, are not represented in the government group. This 
obviously reflects where the core of the Better Regulation agenda is also embedded at the 
national level.  
It is also worth noting that, despite the requirement for the stakeholder group to ensure 
a balanced representation of regions of the EU,
64
 the Platform shows a stronger representation 
from Northern Europe as opposed to Southern, Central and Eastern Europe. Although there is 
obviously a representative for each country in the government group, the stakeholder group 
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relies on a stronger experience with Better Regulation agenda’s in Northern Europe. Besides 
the EU-level associations and institutional actors, the associations come from The 
Netherlands (2), Germany, UK, Finland and Denmark, with ‘the South’ being present with a 
Portuguese association. 
The creation of the REFIT Platform goes hand in hand with the new online tool 
‘Lighten the load – Have your say’. This website is a tool for citizens and businesses to 
provide feedback on EU policy and legislation at any moment in time. The Commission 
wants “to hear what people find irritating, burdensome, or in need of improvement”.
65
 
Although the latter suggests that comments may also propose amendment and re-regulation, 
the focus seems very much on whether the existing regulatory framework is too ‘irritating’ or 
‘burdensome’. 
The Commission replies directly to all entries on the Lighten the Load website and 
will refer the issue further to the REFIT Platform where it is considered if it merits further 
discussion and potential action. By 28 February 2017, most submissions to the website came 
from individual citizens, namely 163, followed by submissions by companies (18), business 
associations (18), public authorities (6), trade unions (1) and consumer organizations (1), with 
14 submissions described as ‘other’. However, the majority of submissions do not provide the 
information the website is aiming for. Often they are statements on non-REFIT-related topics 
or requests for information, in which case the Commission refers to the appropriate 
Commission unit. Of the 163 submissions by citizens,
66
 only nine were considered 
appropriate to be (potentially) taken into consideration for discussion by the REFIT Platform; 
whilst for a similar amount of cases, the Commission’s reply on the website would engage 
with the substance of the matter but explain why it would not be taken up further by the 
Platform. Entries by other categories fared slightly better; yet, most entries would not make it 
to discussion by the Platform; just one of the six public authority entries, three of the 18 
company entries and three of the 14 ‘other’ category. The single entry by a consumer 
organization was considered worth further discussion, whilst the single entry by a trade union 
was not. The business associations’ submissions give most cause to potential discussion by 
the Platform with eight of the 18 submissions being potentially considered for Platform 
discussion. Additionally, a fair amount of other submissions from this group led to an online 
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engagement on substance by the Commission, although it was not considered appropriate for 
further Platform discussion. However, overall, after 20 months since the website’s creation, 
the amount of valuable information that has reached the REFIT Platform via this path appears 
minimal. As the key participatory tool to receive feedback on how EU policy is implemented, 
and particularly on how it creates regulatory burden, the website does not yet appear to live 
up to its expectations. 
 
III Politicization through the Mobilization of Civil Society on Issues of Better Regulation 
 
The rise of Better Regulation as an issue on the political agenda has not gone unnoticed by 
civil society. Civil society organizations, such as environmental organizations, trade unions 
and consumer organizations, have commented on European governance issues for a long time. 
However, over the last 15 years, several European civil society organizations have been set up 
with the particular objective to focus on (some aspect of) the EU Better Regulation agenda. In 
2005, the European Civil Action Service (ECAS) was set up with among its main objectives 
to bring the EU closer to its citizens and increase attention to good governance and 
transparency of EU policymaking. Transparency International also set up an EU office in 
2008.  
In 2009, Corporate Europe Observatory moved its office from Amsterdam to 
Brussels,
67
 intensifying its research on the role of corporate lobbying in EU decision-making 
and asking for changes in the Better Regulation agenda. In 2011, Finance Watch was created 
with the support of the EP and in reaction to the financial crisis, in order to allow civil society 
to play a watchdog role on the quality of EU financial regulation. And finally, and most 
explicitly, a group of civil society organizations set up the Better Regulation Watchdog in 
2015 with the objectives of closely following the developments on Better Regulation; 
increasing understanding among civil society, media and decision makers about the risks and 
potential negative impacts of the Better Regulation agenda on social, environmental, labour, 
consumer and public health standards for citizens and the public interest; and challenging the 
widely held belief that regulation is a burden for society.
68
 
Better Regulation, and evaluation, is thus no longer the realm of a small group of 
technocrats, but its wider orientation and societal impact are discussed by civil society 
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organizations, some of which have been set up with the specific objective of focusing on (a 
part of) the Better Regulation strategy.  
 
F Conclusion: Ex post Evaluation; Vanguard against or Victim of Populism? 
 
With the 2015 Better Regulation package, evaluation has been placed centre stage on the 
Commission’s agenda. Evaluation has become a key tool to steer EU policymaking in 
function of the political priorities of the Commission and the objective of reducing the 
regulatory burden. The hierarchical embedding of evaluation, its more systematic planning 
and its scrutiny via the RSB all contribute to anchoring ex post evaluation to political 
priorities. The focus on linking ex post and ex ante evaluation, the application of evaluation to 
regulatory intervention as well as to expenditure policy and increased attention for the 
interinstitutional dimension of appraisal all contribute to further politicization. Finally, 
politicization is enhanced by increasing the participatory dimension of evaluation. However, 
the way the Commission organizes participation in evaluation also illustrates the ambiguous 
approach to the politicization of evaluation. Whilst interest groups and citizens are 
encouraged to contribute to evaluation, they are not supposed to discuss or put into question 
the objectives of the evaluation process itself. Participation has to function within the political 
parameters already set by the Commission. From that perspective, the Commission presents 
evaluation as a neutral procedural exercise and it fears politicization that would contest the 
underlying political orientation of the pretended neutral exercise. However, some civil society 
organizations have mobilized to do that exactly, that is politicize the debate on evaluation by 
pointing out that appraisal is not a neutral exercise. 
We are at a crucial moment in time where populism risks undermining the basic 
principles of liberal democracy and the pillars on which modern governance is built. 
Evaluation can both fall victim to and be a vanguard against such populism. On the one hand, 
one has to be cautious that evaluation may end up being a tool to appease populist discourse. 
The EU tendency to use evaluation strongly in function of reducing the regulatory burden is a 
risky strategy in this regard. Populist movements all over Europe have taken EU regulatory 
action as one of their primary targets to justify retreat from and demise of the EU, in order to 
‘take back control’ and defend nationalist, protectionist and exclusionary policies. These 
movements all describe the European regulatory framework as a useless set of rules, simply 
there to satisfy the interests of a self-serving bureaucracy and corrupt elite. By increasingly 
stressing the ‘regulatory burden’ of EU policy, the EU risks simply strengthening a populist 
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discourse that is not evidence based. The Juncker Commission’s prioritization of Better 
Regulation to reduce the regulatory burden in reaction to the rise of Euroscepticism in the 
2014 EP elections might therefore backfire. In fact, populism and Euroscepticism have been 
on the rise since the 2014 elections, and it is doubtful that the Better Regulation agenda has 
contributed to weakening rather than strengthening these tendencies. From this perspective, 
the politicization of evaluation is problematic, as it turns a process of (technocratic) learning 
into a (failed) strategy to appease populism.  
At the same time, evaluation is a key tool of evidence-based policymaking required to 
falsify the claims of populist discourse. A more participatory approach to evaluation 
facilitates this role of appraisal. However, such politicization also requires that the objectives 
of the evaluation process itself are not beyond discussion but open to democratic debate. 
 
